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Since the work by Jones and colleagues in the early 1990s the idea that
feelings of anxiety could be interpreted as either facilitative or debilitative to
athletic performance has been widely discussed in the sport psychology litera-
ture (e.g., Jones, 1995). Although this view has been promoted by a number of
researchers (e.g., Hanton, Rich, & Mellalieu, 2008), we argue that this frame-
work is based on flawed empirical research, and not supported by evidence
from mainstream psychology literature (e.g., Fox, 2008; Lewis, Haviland-Jones
& Feldman Barrett, 2008). As stated by Burton (1998), anxiety by definition is
a negatively toned and unpleasant emotion that cannot be facilitative. Both the
DSM IV and applied psychologists who have worked with individuals with
anxiety or anxiety related disorders will attest to the debilitative influence of
anxiety on human functioning. Their observations suggest that the notion of
‘facilitative anxiety’ is a contradiction in terms. An important reason for this
misconception might be the notion that ‘anxiety’, as assessed by some instru-
ments in the sport psychology literature, is not equivalent to ‘anxiety’ assessed
by instruments in other psychology domains. Indeed, there is now strong evi-
dence to suggest that in particular the CSAI-2, which has guided most of the
initial research on facilitative/debilitative anxiety, has not been an adequate
instrument to assess anxiety in sport (Craft, Magyar, Becker, & Feltz, 2003;
Lane, Sewell, Terry, Bartram, & Nesti, 1999). The psychometric properties and
factor structure of the CSAI-2 have been shown to be unreliable (e.g., Cox,
Martens, & Russell, 2003; Lane et al., 1999; Lundqvist & Hassmen, 2005) and
its validity has been equivocal. For example, the construct validity has been
questioned. In particular the ambiguity of the word ‘concern’ (rather than
‘worried’) has been problematic because this could be interpreted either nega-
tively (threat related, debilitative) or positively (challenge, facilitative) by indi-
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viduals (Burton & Naylor, 1997; Lane et al., 1999). In addition, the predictive
validity of the CSAI-2 is relatively low and appears to be influenced by a num-
ber of moderators (Craft et al., 2003; Woodman & Hardy, 2003).
It was actually this lack of clear relationship between the CSAI-2 and per-
formance which resulted in the development of the directional anxiety frame-
work. As Lane (2009) correctly identifies, rather than questioning the validity
of the CSAI-2 researchers added a facilitative/debilitative scale to explain their
findings. More recently, the interdependence of intensity and direction scored
on individual items on the CSAI-2 (or CSAI-2R) has been questioned. In their
study Lundqvist, Kentta and Raglin (in press) showed that only facilitative
responses were provided on items which were not experienced at all or scored
low in intensity by athletes. The authors suggested that summing the items on
the bipolar facilitative/debilitative scale results in misleading conclusions by
exaggerating the significance and actual frequency of facilitative ratings of
symptoms related to anxiety. The outlined limitations of the CSAI-2 and statis-
tical techniques used suggest that results supporting the directional framework
are at best spurious and most likely the results of measurement artefacts
because of the instrument used and statistical techniques adopted. More wor-
ryingly, little psychometric or validity information is available for this addi-
tional facilitative/debilitative scale. Lundquest et al. (in press) demonstrated
that the facilitative scale had little relationship to actual performance. This
observation provides significant concern about the validity of the directional
hypothesis. To further illustrate these arguments, no researcher would suggest
adding a similar debilitative/facilitative scale to Spielberger’s state/trait anxiety
inventory or any other anxiety/emotion inventory for that matter.
Current evidence from neuroscience also does not support the idea that
emotions are interpreted as facilitative or debilitative. For example, there is
strong biological evidence that positive and negative emotional feelings
emerge from ancient subcortical regions which are similar in all mammalian
brains. These are the areas which light up when emotions like anger, sadness
and fear are experienced. At the same time neocortical systems show reduced
arousal levels (e.g., Panksepp, 2008).
The study by Pellizzari et al. (2010) attempted to extend the directional
hypothesis to other emotions regularly experienced by athletes. In addition,
the authors suggested that there is support for this interpretation. However, we
argue that the emotions identified for the different performance states (optimal
pleasant and dysfunctional unpleasant for good, average and poor perfor-
mance), are characterised by dissimilar emotions for the different states rather
than a different interpretation of the same emotion. Such an interpretation is in
line with earlier findings by Folkman and Lazarus (1985) and Folkman (1997)
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who observed that both positive and negative emotions can occur within the
same stressful encounter. The co-occurrence of positive and negative emotions
has mainly been observed in individuals with serious injury (e.g., spinal cord
injury), disease (e.g., AIDS), or experiencing loss (e.g., sudden infant death
syndrome). More recently Nicholls, Hemmings, and Clough (in press) made a
similar observation in a sample of elite golfers. Therefore, we argue that this
framework provides a more eloquent explanation of the findings by Pellizzari
et al. as well as a more fruitful avenue for investigating the emotion – perfor-
mance relationship. The co-occurrence of negative and positive emotions has
both theoretical and practical implications. For example, Folkman (1997) pro-
vided a new model of the coping process. Also, to date it is unclear whether
negative and positive emotions are bipolar or relatively independent in nature.
This is an important issue because it has significant influence on coping behav-
iour (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004). Researchers, therefore, could examine the
relative strength of the different negative and positive emotions on appraisal,
coping and event outcome. For example, the interaction of the different emo-
tions would most likely influence the amount of stress experienced and pri-
mary appraisal of a stressful event with experiencing predominantly negative
emotions resulting in appraising the situation as a threat, whereas predomi-
nately positive emotions would result in appraising the stressful event as a chal-
lenge. It is also likely that the interacting emotions influence secondary
appraisal (perceptions of control over the situation), as well as the actual cop-
ing strategies used (directly or indirectly via the appraisal process), and their
effectiveness with the stressful encounter and ultimately performance. Folk-
man and Moskowitz (2004) have identified the interest in positive emotions
during both acute and chronic stress as one of themost exciting research devel-
opments. We concur with this assumption.
What is clear is that researchers will have to assess a number of negative
and positive emotions (and possibly their strength) to provide a more compre-
hensive and meaningful interpretation of the emotion – performance relation-
ship. In addition, there is a need for the development of valid and reliable
instruments to assist researchers in this endeavour. Taking into consideration
current theory and findings in main stream psychology, we argue that research
on the directional hypothesis in sport and exercise psychology is just an empir-
ical and theoretical cul-de-sac and other theoretical frameworks need to be con-
sidered to explain the emotion – performance relationship.
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